



I have been to Mitrovica several times over the years, but only once was I in the vicinity of Bosniak Mahala in the city's Serb dominated north. Although the development and displacement of gentrification could be at work in this ethnically mixed (Albano-18.5% of the population) Mahala in the north of Kosovo.

### Tale of Two Worlds

However, a right-hand turn takes you to Bosniak Mahala, recognizable by small ineffective barricades and Albanian flags. Strolling along the edge of this neighborhood, looking toward it and looking away from it, is a tale of two worlds. The ethnic non-Serb is the dominant majority within, whereas the ethnic Serb is the dominant majority without. Of course, none of this is hidden from plain sight. This is due, in part, to the

centripetal and centrifugal forces of evocative objects of a nationalist sort that nudge people to stay within their respective enclaves. And these objects nudge in a unique way: one and the same object is often evocative in very different ways depending upon who is viewing it—ethnic Albanian or ethnic Serb, for example.

Take, for instance, the flags that are often displayed by nationalists. The Albanian flag seen next to a pile of debris blocking the road into Bosnian Mahala encourages fellow Albanian nationalists to come together in that neighborhood. The flag has a centripetal effect on them, eliciting in them a feeling of being welcomed in that place and prompting them to behave in certain ways. This same flag, however, is centrifugal for Serb nationalists, eliciting an unwelcoming feeling in them and discouraging them from being in that place, making it unlikely that they will interact and establish relationships with the Albanian residents.

But is this movement toward or away from Bosniak Mahala only a result of feelings? No, for whether a person moves toward or away from an object and its area is also a result of believing. If we agree with the American philosopher W.V. Quine that believing "is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises," then a person self-identifying as a nationalist may motivate that person to respond in

a particular manner. For example, for a person to believe that to live life as a Serb nationalist will preserve the Serb nation against its rivals is to be disposed, among other things, to respond by only living and interacting with fellow Serbs. According to me, 222 Jan 30 2017, a flag dangling from a pole may be enough to motivate one to not venture into what is perceived to be an Albanian enclave.

### Appropriate Distance

Feeling and believing, then, are not to be taken lightly—particularly in a place like Bosniak Mahala and its surrounding, where the sight of certain objects may motivate people to maintain an appropriate distance from one another. At first glance, the consequences of position-

lines of a representative democracy, in which popular sovereignty—or popular will—is expressed by the aggregation of preferences achieved through the act of voting. However, the fact that Kosovo is predominantly ethnic Albanian and is fragmented into ethnic enclaves, and that ethno-nationalism as an ideology holds sway over how many people vote, places in jeopardy the degree to which its democracy is both legitimate and viable, at least in the eyes of its minority peoples.

Such dangers should be taken seriously, especially in a society where ethno-nationalisms' xenophobia and chauvinism run rampant. The English philosopher A.C. Grayling clarified the forces that might be imposed on people, and in this case, on those of an enclave rich plural monoethnic Kosovo. He said "the power of demagoguery, of manipulation of crowd sentiment by fiery rabble-rousing speeches ...which target those very things—emotion and prejudice—so inimical to producing sound government." In such a political environment, where the majority of people are nationalists nervously living in their own echo chambers, nationalist parties increase their ranks, thereby capturing a larger share of the electorate. Although Serb nationalist parties do well in Serb dominated municipalities like Leposavi and Zubin Potok, these parties barely make a ripple nationwide, leaving many Serbs to question not only the legitimacy and viability of the democratic state but the continuance of peace in Kosovo.

### Dampening the Power

Even though representative democracy in Kosovo has been commandeered by ethno-nationalists, who have transformed "the will of the people" into something more like "the wills of the peoples," I am not arguing for the dismantling of Kosovo's democracy. Instead, I am opting for dampening the power of its ethno-nationalisms. Elsewhere I have argued for disproportionate representation with multiple votes as a way to make room for more moderate voices. Here, however, I suggest capturing the discursive, critical, and dialogical elements of deliberative democracy and using them against the fanaticism of nationalism. It is, more or less, a turn to what Grayling calls "the democracy of debate, discussion, the mutual giving of reasons with the aim of reaching agreement or consensus upon which decisions can then be based." Perhaps even more important for peace building is when, according to the American diplomat Harold Saunders, "one's mind opens to absorb

new views, enlarge perspectives, rethink assumptions and modify judgments." The point, however, is not to have only parliamentarians and negotiators make this turn, but also the ordinary people within neighborhoods. The hope is that these elements will end the